The McConnell Corollary: Vague Laws Must Still Toe The Buckley Express Advocacy Line by Berry, Austin M.
  201
The McConnell Corollary: Vague Laws Must Still Toe 
the Buckley Express Advocacy Line 
Austin M. Berry1 
Introduction................................................................................. 202 
Part I: Federal Election Laws Interpreted ................................... 203 
A. FECA and Buckley ............................................................. 203 
B. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. .................................. 205 
Part II: Modern Federal Election Laws....................................... 206 
A. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ................. 206 
B. McConnell v. FEC .............................................................. 208 
C. Justice Thomas’s McConnell Dissent: Footnote Eleven .... 212 
Part III: The Pre-McConnell Circuit Split................................... 213 
A. FEC v. Furgatch................................................................. 213 
B. Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC ...................... 218 
C. FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc................................ 220 
D. Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Williams ................. 222 
E. Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell ............... 223 
F. Citizens for Responsible Government State  
Political Action Committee v. Davidson ......................... 224 
G. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore....... 224 
Part IV: Post-McConnell............................................................. 226 
A. Anderson v. Spear .............................................................. 226 
B. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake:  
An Opportunity to Apply the “McConnell Corollary” ... 230 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 235 
                                                                                                             
 1 J.D. candidate 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A., 1999, Baylor 
University. Editor-in-Chief and Co-Founder of the Seton Hall Circuit Review. I would 
like to thank my parents for always being so generous to me; I do not deserve them.  
Special thanks to Professor Mark C. Alexander for his invaluable guidance in the 
production of this comment. 
202 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:201 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,2 
the Supreme Court of the United States held the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 20023 to be, in substance, constitutional. The new and 
stiffer regulations of the campaign finance bill are having sweeping 
effects in the erudite world of politics both in federal and state races. The 
depth and breadth of the McConnell decision is, as yet, unknown, but the 
contours are being defined constantly. 
The famous Buckley v. Valeo4 decision, with its express advocacy 
standard, is the seed from which all future election law litigation, and 
discussion in this comment, is concerned. In the nearly thirty years after 
that decision, the Buckley express advocacy standard gave rise to 
divergent interpretations among the courts of appeals as to what exactly 
constituted express advocacy, thereby creating a circuit split. Justice 
Thomas, in his McConnell dissent, opined that “by concluding that the 
‘express advocacy’ limitation derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally 
mandated line,” the majority effectively decided the circuit split in favor 
of one circuit and against the six other circuits that had addressed the 
same issue.5 
However, one argument of this comment is that Justice Thomas’s 
assertion is incorrect, i.e. the circuit split still stands.6 This comment also 
argues that the Buckley express advocacy standard still lives. In addition, 
this comment will give special attention to North Carolina Right to Life, 
Inc. v. Leake,7 a likely target for the Supreme Court granting certiorari 
within the next two terms, which is currently winding its way back up 
                                                                                                             
 2 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 3 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 [hereinafter “BCRA”], 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 
(West 2005). This piece of legislation is commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold 
bill, after its primary proponents, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Sen. Russ Feingold (D-
WI). 
 4 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 5 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 278 n.11 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 6 Id. The majority never cited the pre-McConnell split and never addressed it in even 
the most implicit manner. The assertion by a dissenting justice, in a footnote, that the 
majority decided a circuit split it never formally addressed, and decided it in favor of the 
lone circuit against six other circuits, might give one pause to wonder at the validity of 
the Justice’s assertion and might make one wonder even more why an entire comment 
need be written on the subject. But Justice Thomas’s assertion might very well be true, 
and if so, then the circuits involved in this pre-McConnell split have a serious paradigm 
shift to accomplish. One of those circuits, the Fourth, is a fertile ground for determining 
whether Justice Thomas is correct about the split and just how paradigmatically changing 
McConnell is on the interpretation of express advocacy. 
 7 N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 344 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 541 
U.S. 1007 (2004), remanded for reconsideration in light of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003). 
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from the district court in the Fourth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit8 is the only 
court of appeals to have addressed express advocacy post-McConnell and 
thus North Carolina Right to Life, once the Fourth Circuit addresses it, 
could be in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit. In other words, a new 
split could be forming in the courts of appeals. With the pre-McConnell 
split still in effect and a possible post-McConnell split forming and 
perpetuating the first split, there is ample reason for the Supreme Court 
to weigh in on the matter. 
Part I introduces the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19719 and 
its significant 1974 amendments,10 gives special treatment to the seminal 
case of Buckley v. Valeo and briefly discusses Buckley’s effects. Part II 
focuses on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the 
Supreme Court decision interpreting that act, McConnell v. FEC Part III 
describes in detail what I have identified as the “pre-McConnell” split 
among the courts of appeals. Part IV addresses the post-McConnell 
developments by analyzing one case from the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit as well as a Fourth Circuit case that is still pending. This 
part also presents a “corollary argument” regarding why Buckley still 
rules where McConnell is not implicated. 
PART I: FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS INTERPRETED 
A. FECA and Buckley 
In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(“FECA”), followed by significant amendments in 1974. Those 
amendments became the subject of the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo. 
Senator Buckley and several other parties joined forces to challenge the 
Act’s constitutionality arguing that its regulation of campaign financing 
“would do far more to suppress campaign money that was intended to 
further speech . . . than it would to suppress campaign money collected 
from organized economic interests.”11 
One key provision on which the opinion focused involved a $1,000 
annual cap on “expenditure[s] . . . relative to a clearly identified 
candidate,”12 known as the independent expenditure provision. 
                                                                                                             
 8 Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 9 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 1971) (amended 
1974). 
 10 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 
1974). 
 11 Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L. POL’Y 93, 94 
(1997). 
 12 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976). 
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Independent expenditures are monies spent by individuals or groups, not 
in coordination with a candidate, but with the intention of convincing 
voters to vote for a particular candidate.13 Arguably, such expenditures 
are the purest form of political advocacy, “functionally indistinguishable 
from the editorial endorsement . . . by organs of the media.”14 
The plaintiffs argued that expenditure limits thus caused campaigns 
to be more media-oriented and thereby stymied grass-roots participation 
by individuals.15 The Buckley Court acknowledged the First Amendment 
implications and announced that provisions, such as those found in 
FECA, regulating speech must be precise so as “to avoid a chilling effect 
on speech.”16 The Court held that “relative to” must be construed 
narrowly to apply only to communication expenditures that “in express 
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”17 
This narrow construction was necessary to alleviate the otherwise 
constitutional infirmity based on vagueness grounds.18 
The Court’s rephrasing of the Act’s provision is now known as the 
express advocacy standard. The Court’s holding has been interpreted to 
mean that FECA could comply with the First Amendment only if the 
Act’s regulatory reach was limited to those communication expenditures 
that “literally include words which in and of themselves advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate.”19 The bright-line express advocacy 
standard was adopted, at least one court of appeals has found, “in order 
to protect our cherished right to political speech free from government 
censorship.”20 
The Buckley decision elucidated the express advocacy standard it 
had just created through its now-famous Footnote 52, where the Court 
listed several examples of what would definitely constitute express 
advocacy, such as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” and “Smith for 
Congress,” to name merely a few.21 It has been argued that the famous 
footnote, and its so-called “magic words,” helped give rise to “soft 
                                                                                                             
 13 Winter, supra note 11, at 100. 
 14 Id. at 100-01. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Ryan Ellis, Note, “Electioneering Communication” Under the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002: A Constitutional Reclassification of “Express 
Advocacy,” 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 191 (2003). 
 17 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. 
 18 Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 
F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 19 FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
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money” and “issue advocacy.”22 Considerable recent campaign finance 
litigation has centered on the footnote’s definition of express advocacy.23 
Professional campaign consultants have become increasingly 
sophisticated in their avoidance of the magic words so as to, seemingly, 
take their ads out of the reach of FECA.24 Recent revelations from the 
justices’ interoffice memoranda from the time of the Buckley opinion’s 
drafting indicate that the justices “seemed unaware that the late-added 
footnote 52 would have such an impact on electoral politics.”25 It has 
been argued that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(“BCRA”), also known as the McCain-Feingold bill, is a direct challenge 
to Buckley’s footnote 52 by regulating campaign speech with a different 
bright-line.26 
B. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
In 1986, ten years after Buckley, the Supreme Court had its first 
opportunity to apply the express advocacy requirement in FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”).27 In MCFL, a non-profit 
corporation paid, out of its general treasury fund, for the publication and 
distribution of newsletters prior to a primary election. The newsletter 
explicitly encouraged voters to vote for pro-life candidates, but never 
said “vote for Smith” specifically, as footnote 52 of Buckley suggested. 
Instead, it simply showed the pictures of pro-life candidates and then 
encouraged voters to vote pro-life. 
The specific challenge to this usage by the non-profit was based on 
§ 441b of FECA which prohibits corporations from using treasury funds 
to make expenditures in connection with a federal election.28 After 
observing that Buckley’s rationale was equally applicable to this 
corporation expenditure provision, the Court held that express advocacy 
also applies to § 441b.29 As one court of appeals interpreted it, the 
Supreme Court, in MCFL, “unanimously engrafted onto [the corporation 
expenditure provision] Buckley’s ‘express advocacy’ limitation.”30 The 
MCFL Court reasoned that the encouragement to vote pro-life in the 
same newsletter as named pro-life candidates was only slightly less 
                                                                                                             
 22 Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION 
L.J. 241, 242 (2003). 
 23 Id. at 250. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 242. 
 26 Id. at 250. 
 27 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 28 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 2005). 
 29 Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 249. 
 30 FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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direct than ‘vote for Smith.’31 It therefore concluded that the nonprofit’s 
newsletter did violate the express advocacy prohibition of FECA, as 
articulated in Buckley.32 Thus, as the 5th Circuit interpreted MCFL, the 
Supreme Court “extended the ‘express advocacy’ inquiry to include 
consideration of the logical relationship between an express term 
advocating election or defeat and the names of specific candidates 
identified in the communication.”33 
PART II: MODERN FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS 
A. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
Since Buckley there have been nearly thirty years of litigation and 
application of the express advocacy standard in the lower courts. Some 
have said that the Buckley ‘magic words’ test is “ridiculously easy to 
evade and utterly fails to distinguish election-related from other political 
speech.”34 The Supreme Court, in McConnell v. FEC, found that 
“Buckley’s express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative 
effort to combat real or apparent corruption.”35 As a result of this 
undercurrent of belief that Buckley was somehow inadequate in 
combating corruption, Congress passed BCRA,36 which made substantial 
amendments and changes to FECA. BCRA is an act focused primarily on 
contribution restrictions and contribution disclosure. It has been argued 
that no speech is banned by BCRA and that the only new requirements of 
the act “relate to the disclosure and sources of funding for television and 
radio ads close to an election that feature federal candidates and that are 
targeted to the races in which these candidates are running.”37 
Ostensibly, BCRA was premised on the idea, not that there was too 
much money in campaigns, but that there was too great a nexus between 
large donors, political parties and elected officials.38 This nexus was 
broken up by Title I of BCRA, which essentially banned all forms of 
                                                                                                             
 31 Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 249-50. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 34 Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign 
Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 167 (2004). Vice Dean Briffault of Columbia Law 
School was coauthor of an amicus brief submitted on behalf of twenty-five House of 
Representatives members defending the constitutionality of BCRA. Id. at 147 n.a1. 
 35 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193-94 (2003). 
 36 BCRA, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 2005). 
 37 Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Separating Myth From Reality in 
McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 291, 296 (2004). 
 38 Id. at 294. 
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‘soft money.’39 Soft money was money that individuals and corporations 
could give to national parties that was not regulated by FECA or the 
Federal Election Commission.40 Title II of BCRA helped break up the 
so-called nexus by creating and regulating a new category of federal 
campaign activity called ‘electioneering communication.’41 This new 
term was created to deal with the “problem of so-called issue advocacy 
advertising,”42 i.e. advertising that was the functional equivalent of 
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, but did so just outside 
the reach of the Buckley express advocacy standard. 
An advertisement is an electioneering communication if it is a 
broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office, is broadcast within 60 days before 
a general election (or 30 days before a primary) and the broadcast can be 
received by more than 50,000 people in the candidate’s represented 
territory.43 Congress excepted several communications and media from 
the definition of electioneering communication including any 
communication appearing through a news story, commentary or 
editorial; any debate or forum discussion among the candidates and any 
advertisement thereof by the sponsoring organization; and any 
communication which constitutes an independent expenditure.44 
Some argue that through BCRA, Congress banned broadcast 
advertising, which is “the most effective means of communicating to 
large numbers of citizens, on short notice, with maximal impact.”45 By 
creating such a broadcasting ban, “Congress banned communications 
about public officials at the most crucial times, the month or two before 
elections.”46 Proponents of BCRA argue that no such communications 
ban exists; instead the electioneering communication definition merely 
defines when federal disclosure regulation takes effect.47 It is true, 
however, that if a communication is deemed an electioneering 
communication, then there is a ban on the use of corporate or union 
treasury funds to pay for such communications.48 Defenders of BCRA 
would phrase the electioneering communication definition as providing 
                                                                                                             
 39 See BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 431. 
 40 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123. 
 41 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A). 
 42 Briffault, supra note 34, at 155. 
 43 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A) & (C) (also known as the 60/30 rule, see infra 
text accompanying note 48). 
 44 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B). 
 45 James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Electioneering Communication Versus 
Abortion, 3 ELECTION L.J. 205, 207 (2004). 
 46 Id. at 208. 
 47 See Briffault, supra note 34. 
 48 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). 
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regulators with two tests: (1) the 60/30 day rule to “remedy the evasion 
of disclosure requirements;” and (2) the public communication rule, by 
which only hard money can pay for ads that support or oppose federal 
candidates.49 Supporting the BCRA defenders’ position is that there has 
been “no appreciable evidence that the political landscape is pocked with 
the debris of shattered parties, shackled and muted groups and 
individuals, or any other deleterious developments.”50 
The criticisms of BCRA continue and, for some, the Act “is a 
broadside attack on core political speech and the corresponding freedom 
to criticize the state.”51 Some view BCRA as essentially destroying the 
category of issue advocacy by interpreting the Act to say that any 
broadcast communication referring to a federal candidate and occurring 
within the window before the election is now subject to disclosure 
requirements and the ban on treasury spending, regardless of whether 
that communication contained express advocacy.52 Others, including 
BCRA proponents, however, contend that the world after BCRA merely 
“reflects modest adjustments in the campaign finance regime under 
Buckley, not a world in [which] the Buckley structure will become 
irrelevant or unrecognizable.”53 Some go farther and pronounce that, 
under BCRA, the express advocacy test is alive and well, going to great 
lengths to show how the express advocacy test distinguishes between 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications and issue 
advocacy.54 
B. McConnell v. FEC 
BCRA, much like FECA, was destined for the Supreme Court of 
the United States before it was ever enacted. The Court got its chance to 
speak to BCRA’s constitutionality and did so in the landmark case of 
McConnell v. FEC. By a narrow55 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court upheld 
the majority of challenged provisions in BCRA. The Court’s McConnell 
decision has been heralded, by Vice Dean Briffault, as “the single 
greatest legal victory for campaign finance regulation since . . . FECA 
[and] Buckley.”56 The decision has even been described as answering 
                                                                                                             
 49 Briffault, supra note 34, at 168. 
 50 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 37, at 297. 
 51 Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Restricting Political Campaign Speech: The Uneasy Legacy of 
McConnell v. FEC, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 839, 839 (2004). 
 52 Id. at 846. 
 53 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 37, at 297. 
 54 See Bopp & Coleson, infra note 81. 
 55 See infra text accompanying notes 79-80 (discussing the relevance of this narrow 
margin). 
 56 Briffault, supra note 34, at 147. 
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more questions than it opens, a rarity for the Court.57 Another 
commentator, Thomas Mann, considers the opinion “notable for . . . its 
refreshingly pragmatic view of money and politics.”58 Briffault notes that 
the opinion is considered remarkable, in part, for having devoted a mere 
paragraph, sans footnote, to the constitutionality of “electioneering 
communication.”59 According to Mann, such an “abrupt affirmation . . . 
represents . . . a triumph of experience and pragmatism over rigid 
ideology and doctrine.”60 James Bopp, a member of those less 
appreciative of the Court’s “abrupt affirmation,” caustically frames the 
decision as upholding the electioneering communication ban that forbids 
broadcast ads “even if an ad merely asks constituents to tell 
Congressman Intransigent to vote for the Bipartisan Fix-All-Problems 
Act during the busy legislative period before candidates rush home for 
campaigning preceding the election.”61 
Briffault describes the central themes of McConnell as validating 
the notion that: campaign finance restrictions promote democratic values; 
competing constitutional concerns are inherent in campaign finance 
restrictions; and Congress is due considerable deference in such an area 
as campaign finance because its members have the greater understanding 
of its implications.62 Thus, McConnell can be viewed as not just an 
affirmation of BCRA, but of campaign finance reform generally.63 
The Court addressed the problem of distinguishing between issue 
and express advocacy and declared that while the distinction, as 
espoused in Buckley, “seemed neat in theory, the two categories of 
advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects.”64 
The Court relied upon campaign professionals who likened the most 
effective campaign ads to the most effective Coca-Cola ads in that they 
both avoid the use of magic words,65 i.e. specifically telling the audience 
to go buy Coke or go vote for Smith. One particularly poignant footnote 
quotes an individual as declaring that “[w]hat separates issue advocacy 
and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.”66 
Opponents of BCRA argued that Congress could not 
constitutionally require the disclosure of or regulate expenditures for 
                                                                                                             
 57 Id. at 172. 
 58 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 37, at 291. 
 59 Briffault, supra note 34, at 169. 
 60 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 37, at 292. 
 61 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 45, at 208. 
 62 Briffault, supra note 34, at 174. 
 63 Id. at 149. 
 64 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003). 
 65 Id. at 127. 
 66 Id. at 128 n.16. 
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electioneering communications without making a Buckley exception for 
those communications that do not meet the express advocacy standard. 
The Court dismissed those arguments by holding that the “express 
advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a 
first principle of constitutional law.”67 McConnell declares that the 
Buckley express advocacy limitation was a product of statutory 
interpretation,68 in order to “avoid the shoals of vagueness,”69 but that the 
Court “nowhere suggested [in Buckley] that a statute that was neither 
vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same express advocacy 
line.”70 Turning to the actual definition of electioneering communication, 
the Court found that the definition “raises none of the vagueness 
concerns that drove [the] analysis in Buckley” and thus “the 
constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley” to create 
the express advocacy standard was “simply inapposite” in McConnell.71 
The McConnell Court’s wholesale endorsement of the 
constitutionality of the BCRA portions, which treat all ads referring to a 
clearly identified federal candidate and broadcast to the candidate’s 
constituency as electioneering communications has been viewed, even by 
BCRA defenders, as surprising, to say the least.72 The Court’s 
declaration that the Buckley holding was not a constitutional holding, but 
merely a statutory interpretation has been deemed “a little 
disingenuous.”73 But in the same breath, the Court is praised by 
commentators for its well-advised abandonment of the express advocacy 
test due to the “powerful [and] uncontroverted evidence . . . that most 
issue advocacy advertising is functionally equivalent to magic words 
express advocacy.”74 
Legal scholars have dissected McConnell and found that the Court 
dismissed the significance of overbreadth problems in various ways. 
First, corporations and unions could continue to run issue ads so long as 
such ads avoid any reference to federal candidates.75 Second, even if the 
new electioneering communication provision would touch upon some 
true issue ads, a corporation or union could continue to pay for such ads 
during the blackout period by creating and using its political action 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. at 190. 
 68 Id. at 191. 
 69 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1976)). 
 70 Id. at 192. 
 71 Id. at 194. 
 72 Briffault, supra note 34, at 157. 
 73 Id. at 168. 
 74 Id. 
 75 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2004). 
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committee (PAC).76 Thus, it has been advanced that, with regard to 
express advocacy, issue advocacy and the need for a constitutionally 
acceptable method of distinguishing between the two, the Supreme 
Court, in McConnell, “concluded that there was really no constitutional 
issue at all.”77 
Arguably, McConnell was a “sweeping victory for reform” in that it 
not only upheld nearly all of the challenged provisions, but also by the 
tone the opinion struck in support of campaign finance reform 
generally.78 However, the decision was 5-4, narrow by anyone’s 
estimate, and the dissenters broke from the majority based upon their 
general approach to campaign finance regulation, as opposed to narrow 
points of law or the application of law to fact.79 Thus, the McConnell 
decision could be short-lived were a make-up in the Court’s composition 
to change, even by one justice. As Vice Dean Briffault put it, the “long-
term significance of McConnell is thus uncertain and ultimately hostage 
to future changes in the composition of the Court.”80 
Despite the arguments some make about what McConnell says 
regarding campaign finance regulation generally and about Buckley and 
the express advocacy standard specifically, other observers would 
interpret the Court’s opinion differently. One has argued that the very 
significance of McConnell is that it created a “McConnell exception” to 
the Buckley and MCFL express advocacy test that protects issue 
advocacy.81 Admitting that McConnell squarely addresses the express 
advocacy test as not constitutionally mandated, the decision still requires 
that there be a functional equivalent.82 Arguably, the Supreme Court 
analyzed ‘electioneering communication’ within the Buckley framework 
by concluding that the definition was not vague and that it targeted the 
“functional equivalent” of express advocacy.83 The result of McConnell 
can be viewed as merely the third in a line of precedents going back 
through MCFL to Buckley in that statutes placing any significant burden 
on issue advocacy must avoid vagueness and overbreadth by employing 
the express advocacy test or a functional equivalent.84 Despite these 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. 
 77 Briffault, supra note 34, at 171. 
 78 Id. at 176. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment is Still Not a 
Loophole: Examining McConnell’s Exception to Buckley’s General Rule Protecting 
Issue Advocacy, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 289 (2004). 
 82 Id. at 291. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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glass-half-full analyses by those who disapproved of BCRA initially, the 
same opponents are offended by the decision in McConnell in that it 
“presumes that helping Congress inhibit circumvention is so important 
that the liberty of the people to speak and participate in democracy must 
be suppressed.”85 By contrast, Buckley and MCFL are to be heralded in 
that they “presume that free speech [is such an important] part of 
American democracy, that even if some of it influences elections it must 
be permitted because of the greater good of liberty and participatory 
government.”86 
C. Justice Thomas’s McConnell Dissent: Footnote Eleven 
Justice Thomas’s dissent provides important insight into the chasm 
that divides the Court regarding campaign finance regulation. Thomas 
takes the majority’s cursory assertion that the magic words of Buckley 
cannot meaningfully distinguish between electioneering and true issue 
ads and turns that assertion on its head. Thomas argues that “[s]peech 
containing the ‘magic words’ is ‘unambiguously campaign related,’ 
while speech without these words is not.”87 Addressing the majority’s 
assertion that so many ads falling outside of the net of express advocacy 
are in reality express advocacy, Justice Thomas argues that it is a first 
principle of the First Amendment that fully protected speech not become 
regulated simply because it is difficult to differentiate in practice.88 
Quoting the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 
Thomas contends that “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful 
speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.”89 In response to the 
majority’s point that Buckley’s express advocacy line has not helped to 
combat corruption, Thomas takes an entirely different approach and 
asserts that “Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating real 
or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech 
unrelated to election campaigns.”90 
One of Justice Thomas’s disagreements with the majority opinion 
and BCRA is that the definition of electioneering communications covers 
“a significant number of communications that do not use words of 
express advocacy.”91 Appended to this concern about the definition is 
                                                                                                             
 85 Id. at 339 
 86 Id. 
 87 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 88 Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 89 Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 
234, 255 (2002)). 
 90 Id. at 282 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 278 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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footnote eleven, in which the Justice declares that “[t]he Court, in 
upholding most of [BCRA’s] provisions by concluding that the ‘express 
advocacy’ limitation derived in Buckley is not a constitutionally 
mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that 
has addressed this question (except, perhaps, one).”92 The footnote goes 
on to cite seven cases in different courts of appeals, six of which fall one 
way and one falling another.93 In the next Part, this comment will 
carefully analyze every decision involved in this circuit split. 
PART III: THE PRE-MCCONNELL CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. FEC v. Furgatch 
The first decision to be rendered in what has become the pre-
McConnell split, in 1987, is also the decision that became the lone 
minority as six other circuits spoke on the matter.94 In late October 1980, 
a few days before the Presidential election, Harvey Furgatch, an 
individual not working in concert with any campaign or candidate, took 
out an advertisement in the New York Times and then, the day before the 
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 278 n.11 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 93 Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting). The cases cited on one side of the ledger are FEC v. 
Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); Iowa Right to Life Comm., 
Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 1999); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. 
Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000); Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political 
Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000); Chamber of Commerce v. 
Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002).  
Also on that side of the ledger, Justice Thomas cited Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309 
(1st Cir. 1997), but a careful analysis of the case reveals that while it is election law 
related, it is inapposite to the holdings of all the other cases. As such, for purposes of this 
discussion, it will be assumed that the Justice intended FEC v. Maine Right to Life 
Comm., Inc., 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), which is a one page affirmance of Maine Right to 
Life v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996). This assumption is plausible because another 
party to Clifton was Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. and the case was decided about 
the same time. This circuit split has been recognized elsewhere and so, arguably, the First 
Circuit case in the split could be Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1990). The lone 
case to which Justice Thomas referred, in opposition to all the other circuits which have 
spoken on the issue, was FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).  
This circuit split, in sometimes slightly varied form, has also been recognized by 
other courts and commentators. See North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 344 F.3d 
418, 426 (2004) and Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 187 n.5 
(5th Cir. 2002), in which the Fifth Circuit ultimately became part of the split and declared 
that “[t]he sole departure from [the] bright-line approach among” the circuits came in 
Furgatch. See also Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of 
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 155 nn.54-55 (2004); Ryan Ellis, Note, 
“Electioneering Communication” Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: 
A Constitutional Reclassification of “Express Advocacy,” 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 
199-200 (2003). 
 94 FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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election, took out the same advertisement in The Boston Globe, 
regarding his admonishment of President Carter.95 The FEC brought suit 
against Furgatch for failing to report the $25,000 he spent on the 
advertisements and for failing to include a disclaimer in The Boston 
Globe ad.96 Furgatch won his motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim in the district court because the court concluded that the 
advertisement did not meet the express advocacy requirement of Buckley, 
which was subsequently incorporated into § 431(17) of FECA.97 Upon 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue before it as deciding whether 
Furgatch was indeed required to report his expenditures for the ads and if 
he was so required by the Act, then was the Act constitutional in its 
demand.98 It was a question of first impression for the court of appeals.99 
Attempting to set the tone from the beginning and assure that the court 
understood the importance of the question, it declared that the appeal 
before it required the court to “resolve the conflict between a citizen’s 
right to speak without burden and society’s interest in ensuring a fair and 
representative forum of debate by identifying the financial sources of 
particular kinds of speech.”100 
Reviewing the history of FECA and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Buckley, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Buckley Court’s reasoning and 
posited that Congress’s restrictions on freedom of expression must be 
“minimal, and closely tailored to avoid overreaching or vagueness.”101 
Turning towards the FEC’s argument against Furgatch, the court 
determined that the FEC viewed Buckley’s magic words as mere 
                                                                                                             
 95 Id. at 858. The advertisement read in full: 
DON’T LET HIM DO IT. The President of the United States continues 
degrading the electoral process and lessening the prestige of the office. It 
was evident months ago when his running mate outrageously suggested Ted 
Kennedy was unpatriotic. The President remained silent. And we let him. It 
continued when the President himself accused Ronald Reagan of being 
unpatriotic. And we let him do it again. In recent weeks, Carter has tried to 
buy entire cities, the steel industry, the auto industry, and others with public 
funds. We are letting him do it. He continues to cultivate the fears, not the 
hopes, of the voting public by suggesting the choice is between “peace and 
war,” “black or white,” “north or south,” and “Jew vs. Christian.”  His 
meanness of spirit is divisive and reckless McCarthyism at its worst. And 
from a man who once asked, “Why Not the Best?”  It is an attempt to hide 
his own record, or lack of it. If he succeeds the country will be burdened 
with four more years of incoherencies, ineptness and illusion, as he leaves a 
legacy of low-level campaigning. DON’T LET HIM DO IT. 
 96 Id. at 859. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 858. 
 99 Id. at 861. 
 100 Id. at 858. 
 101 Id. at 860 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78-82 (1976)). 
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guidelines and not mandatory for inclusion in an ad to make it express 
advocacy.102 Instead, the FEC contended, the “test is whether or not the 
advertisement contains a message advocating the defeat of a political 
candidate.”103 
The Ninth Circuit summarized the FEC’s argument thus, but never 
addressed the glaring difference between Buckley’s express advocacy 
requirement and the FEC’s new interpretation, i.e. the incredibly 
important, but missing adverb before ‘advocating’: expressly. There is a 
considerable difference between “a message advocating the defeat of a 
political candidate” and one that expressly advocates such a defeat. The 
Ninth Circuit simply glossed over this omission. The court simplistically 
summarized Furgatch’s argument to say that if his ad had been express, 
there would be no debate in federal court over the matter and thus he is 
right and the FEC is wrong.104 Furgatch also argued that “don’t let him 
do it” could merely be Furgatch’s warning to the public “that Carter will 
be re-elected if the public allow[ed] him to continue to use ‘low-level 
campaign tactics.’”105 
The Ninth Circuit chafed that neither party’s counsel provided the 
court “with an analysis of the standard to be used or even a thoughtful 
list of the factors which [the court] might consider in evaluating an 
‘express advocacy’ dispute.”106 The court warned that the federal courts 
were in danger of inconsistent analysis and application of ‘express 
advocacy’ without such a framework.107 As though it were sufficient 
simply to state it, the court asserted that the express advocacy language 
of Buckley, and the subsequent statute, did not draw a “bright and 
unambiguous line.”108 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit’s difficulty with 
determining what constitutes express advocacy was not a difficulty for 
the other six courts of appeals, each of which understood the ‘express 
advocacy’ line to be quite bright and unambiguous.109 
The court delineated the importance of the disclosure provisions as 
being two-fold: keeping the electorate informed and deterring or 
exposing corruption.110 Setting up its decision to read out the ‘express’ in 
express advocacy, the court declared that even though freedom of speech 
                                                                                                             
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 861. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See, infra, the remainder of Part III in which the other courts of appeals decisions 
are analyzed. 
 110 Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. 
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is important, it is also important that the purposes of the Act not be 
“cleverly circumvented, or thwarted by a rigid construction of the terms 
of the Act.”111 Asserting that Furgatch wished the court to “reject intra-
textual interpretation,” the court took the opposite tack and found that the 
“proper understanding of the speaker’s message can best be obtained by 
considering speech as a whole.”112 The court also asserted that in the 
battle of importance, the effect of political speech won out over the 
intent.113 Such an assertion, were it to be the rule, would inevitably lead 
to that chilling effect on speech because every speaker would henceforth 
worry about how his message could be interpreted. 
Referring to other kinds of speech such as subversive, ‘fighting 
words,’ libel and speech in the workplace, the court pointed out that 
context is one of the crucial factors in making those kinds of speech 
regulable.114 The Ninth Circuit then explained that the importance of 
context “declines considerably” when the standard is ‘express 
advocacy.’115 The declination of importance relegates ‘context’ to the 
periphery.116 Remarkably, however, the court, in the very next sentence, 
concluded that context is relevant,117 and then went on to impress its 
importance. 
With its explanation of the necessity of a contextual approach, the 
court formulated a “standard for express advocacy that [would] preserve 
the efficacy of the Act without treading upon the freedom of political 
expression.”118 The standard declared that speech, “when read as a 
whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no 
other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against 
a specific candidate.”119 The court then broke down its reasonable person 
standard into three main components: (1) the speech’s message must 
have only one plausible meaning; (2) the speech must make a “clear plea 
for action”; and (3) the action advocated must also be clear.120 The court 
emphasized the importance of there being no reasonable alternative 
reading of the speech in order to make certain that ‘express advocacy’ is 
adhered to in practice.121 
                                                                                                             
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 863 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 863. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 864 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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Next turning to the application of the facts of the instant case to the 
newly formulated standard of express advocacy, the court flatly rejected 
Furgatch’s argument that the advertisement could be read as something 
other than asking voters to vote against Carter.122 Almost comically, the 
court pointed out that the district court focused, improperly, on the word 
‘it’, when it should have focused on ‘don’t let him.’123 After declaring 
that the action advocated must be clear, the court found that readers of 
Furgatch’s ads were “presented with an express call to action, but no 
express indication of what action [was] appropriate.”124 Quite 
disturbingly however, the court then held “that this failure to state with 
specificity” does not prevent the court from finding express advocacy.125 
The court reasoned that Furgatch’s ad directly attacked Carter and not 
any stand Carter took on an issue.126 Thus, there was “vagueness in 
Furgatch’s message, but no ambiguity.”127 
Legislatures and courts should heed George F. Will’s advice in his 
commencement address at Washington University in Saint Louis in 
1998: “follow the simple microrules and you might avoid a lot of the 
macroproblems that will elicit ever more complex and coagulating rules, 
laws and regulations.”128 Will was talking about flossing and using 
sunscreen, but we can apply the same principle here. In this case the 
microrule is that, as Americans, we have the freedom of speech. By 
following this simple rule, the government could avoid a lot of the 
macroproblems that come from the increasingly difficult to follow 
election laws, namely BCRA. 
Many will likely disagree with me that freedom of speech is a rule 
that can be useful in today’s “modern” era. Many think that the 
complexities of today require great profundities expressed through 
elaborate laws, but it is the classic error of the pseudo-intellectual to 
assume that only the complex can be profound. But, if “freedom of 
speech” is too simplistic a rule, then we can assign the express advocacy 
standard as a slightly less, but still simple enough, microrule. That is, 
express words advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate can be subject to disclosure and contribution requirements, but 
nothing else, period. By expanding a simple microrule into something 
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. (Furgatch’s advertisement read, in part, “DON’T LET HIM DO IT.” See supra 
note 95.). 
 124 Id. at 865. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 GEORGE F. WILL, WITH A HAPPY EYE BUT . . .: AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1997-
2002 198 (2002). 
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more, as the contextual approach in Furgatch did, you end up with 
potentially devastating macroproblems, such as a frightening erosion of 
the freedom to say what you want about a political issue or candidate 
within a few months of an election. 
B. Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC 
Nine years after Furgatch, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
had the opportunity to interpret FEC regulations pertaining to what 
constitutes express advocacy.129 The First Circuit opinion on the matter is 
but a one page affirmance of the district court’s decision and reasoning 
and thus the district court opinion will be examined for purposes of this 
comment. The plaintiffs in Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC 
(“MRLC”) were the Maine Right to Life Committee (the “Committee”), 
a nonprofit corporation, and an individual who was not a member of the 
pro-life organization, but read its publications.130 The plaintiffs sought a 
declaratory judgment that the FEC’s definition of express advocacy was 
“too broad, beyond the authority of the FEC and unconstitutionally 
vague.”131 The court framed the issue as a question of whether the FEC 
acted beyond its power in the express advocacy definition it formulated, 
to which corporate financial support is prohibited.132 Citing to the then-
recently promulgated FEC rules on the matter, the court declared that the 
instant case was the first opportunity for judicial review of the new FEC 
rules.133 The court quoted the rule and found that it was obvious that the 
challenged subpart (b) came directly from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Furgatch.134 
                                                                                                             
 129 FEC v. Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996). As a threshold 
matter, I expect many people to have a natural aversion to the opinions of the majority of 
circuits discussed in this comment by the sheer virtue of the parties that are winning. As 
is undoubtedly recognized just from the case names, the majority comes from the 
challenges of pro-life organizations. Abortion being such a divisive issue, it is easy to see 
how a pro-choice individual would be far more inclined to agree with the Ninth Circuit in 
Furgatch in order to sweep in more speech, namely the pro-life movement’s speech. But 
it cannot be ignored that if the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, as is certainly 
possible in the next few years, then it could just as easily be the “North Carolina Right to 
Choice Committee” that is worried that it will not be able to speak out about its issue. 
Regardless of your stance on abortion, we must all be in agreement that a rich debate in 
the public forum is far preferred to one that is increasingly stymied by governmental 
intervention into the first area that the Bill of Rights was designed to exclude the 
government: speech. 
 130 Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D. Me. 1996). 
 131 Id. at 9. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 11. The challenged FEC rule, 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2005), defined 
expressly advocating as any communication that: 
2005] MCCONNELL COROLLARY 219 
The plaintiffs argued that Furgatch and the resulting FEC rule went 
further than Buckley and MCFL permitted.135 The district court agreed 
and found that the Ninth Circuit had to “enlarge . . . Buckley’s definition 
of express advocacy” to reach the decision in favor of the FEC it did in 
Furgatch.136 The district court recognized the importance of context in 
determining the meaning of words, but then found that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Buckley and MCFL were based upon a belief that the 
discussion of issues was something to be protected even if it meant that 
some advocacy would go unregulated.137 The district court reasoned that 
“[i]n the stressful context of public discussion with deadlines, bright 
lights and cameras, the speaker need not pause to debate the shades of 
meaning in language.”138 The court found that the communication at 
issue in Furgatch was “precisely the type of communication that Buckley 
[and] Massachusetts Citizens for Life . . . would permit and subpart (b) 
would prohibit.”139 Following up this conclusion, the court gave several 
reasonable interpretations of the communication in Furgatch and found 
that express advocacy was not present.140 
Quoting from the FEC’s Explanation and Justification for its new 
rule, the court interpreted such reasoning by the FEC to mean that “what 
is issue advocacy a year before the election may become express 
advocacy on the eve of the election and the speaker must continually re-
evaluate his or her words as the election approaches.”141 This was too 
much for the district court, which found that such a scenario would have 
too great a chilling effect on First Amendment freedom of expression 
and thus it granted plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment.142 
In the post-McConnell world, MRLC should turn out the same 
because the FEC rule contained none of the specificities of BCRA’s 
electioneering communication definition. If a rule fails to avoid the 
                                                                                                             
When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such 
as the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable 
person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more 
clearly identified candidate(s) because—(1) The electoral portion of the 
communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one 
meaning; and (2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it 
encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified 
candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 11-12. 
 138 Id. at 12. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 13. 
 142 Id. at 13. 
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“shoals of vagueness”143 then it must submit to the Buckley express 
advocacy test and as the MRLC court concluded, such a vague rule fails 
Buckley and therefore it must be abolished in favor of core First 
Amendment concerns. 
C. FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc. 
In FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc. (“CAN II”), 144 the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the position advanced by the 
FEC, with respect to what constituted express advocacy, “not 
substantially justified” in light of Buckley and MCFL.145 CAN II was 
actually a suit brought by the Christian Action Network (the “Network”) 
requesting fees and costs after the FEC brought suit against the Network 
for violating FECA through corporate expenditures for an ad the FEC 
deemed as express advocacy.146 The FEC lost that suit in the district 
court and the Fourth Circuit issued a one page affirmance of the 
opinion.147 Thus, CAN II was really not so much a case about whether the 
FEC’s definition of express advocacy was constitutional according to the 
Fourth Circuit and more about how untenable the FEC’s position was 
deemed in that circuit.148   
In the underlying suit, the FEC conceded that the Network’s 
television commercial did not contain explicit words or language 
advocating the election or defeat of a particular candidate, but the 
Network violated FECA anyway because the ad expressly advocated 
“through the superimposition of selected imagery, film footage, and 
music, over the nonprescriptive background language.”149 The FEC 
argued that the advertisement constituted express advocacy because it 
was delivered to viewers shortly before the election and the “message 
employ[ed] powerful symbolism and persuasive devices unique to the 
                                                                                                             
 143 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1976) (“Where the constitutional 
requirement of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to construe the 
statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature’s purpose, to avoid the shoals of 
vagueness.”). 
 144 FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1061 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1050. 
 147 FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (adopting 
district court opinion FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 946, 959 
(W.D. Va. 1995)). 
 148 See infra Part IV, which discusses how the CAN II opinion came back to haunt the 
Fourth Circuit in some respects. 
 149 Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d at 1050. The Network’s advertisement 
contained the following words read by a narrator during the commercial: “Bill Clinton’s 
vision for America includes job quotas for homosexuals, giving homosexuals special civil 
rights, allowing homosexuals in the armed forces. Al Gore supports homosexual couples’ 
adopting children and becoming foster parents. Is this your vision for a better America?” 
2005] MCCONNELL COROLLARY 221 
medium of video.”150 Remarkably, the FEC admitted that there was no 
literal phrase such as ‘Defeat Bill Clinton,’ but nonetheless argued that 
the ad “contain[ed] a special kind of charged rhetoric and symbolism that 
exhorted more forcefully and unambiguously than mere words.”151 The 
Fourth Circuit judiciously found that it “would bridle at the power over 
political speech that would reside in the FEC under such an 
interpretation.”152 
After an analysis of Furgatch, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
FEC’s position on what constituted express advocacy was based on a 
“misreading” of Furgatch and a “profound misreading” of Buckley and 
MCFL.153 Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit did not disagree with 
Furgatch’s holding, but did find that the Ninth Circuit used “soft 
language when describing the framework within which the express 
advocacy determination is to be made.”154 However, the Fourth Circuit 
considered the Ninth Circuit’s ‘soft’ language as mere dicta and that the 
central idea of Furgatch was not without validity.155 In its attempt to 
distinguish the facts of CAN II and Furgatch, the court found that 
Furgatch contained a bold call to action, but no such call existed in the 
Network’s ad. 156 In fact, the court found that there were not “any words 
urging voters to take any action whatsoever.”157 
The Fourth Circuit then diverged into a lesson in the power of 
precedent, disguised as a lesson in brief writing, aimed at the FEC.158 
The court found that throughout the FEC’s 69 page brief on the merits of 
the case, “it never once quote[d] any of the numerous passages in 
Buckley and MCFL referring to ‘explicit words’ or ‘express words’ or 
‘language’ of advocacy.”159 The court found this particularly significant 
since every federal court to have addressed Buckley’s express advocacy 
standard has quoted one or more passages referring to the requirement of 
‘words’ of advocacy.160 After berating the FEC on its less-than-candid 
brief writing, the court rejected the FEC’s argument as disingenuous that 
“‘no words of advocacy are necessary to expressly advocate the election 
of a candidate’” and that such an argument could not be advanced in 
                                                                                                             
 150 Id. at 1061. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 1055 n.6. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 1060. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 1063. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
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good faith.161 Similar to MRLC, the CAN II decision should likewise be 
identical if decided today. The same rule would still be just as offensive 
to First Amendment values and such a rule should still cause a court to 
“bridle at the power over political speech”162 such an enforcer would 
possess. 
D. Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Williams 
The Eighth Circuit, in Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. 
Williams (“IRLC”), was the first, of what I have labeled the ‘pre-
McConnell’ split, to deal with a state campaign regulation.163 The IRLC 
challenged several Iowa state campaign and election statutes and related 
administrative regulations on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.164 The court in IRLC found unconstitutional the state’s 
requirement that independent expenditures expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a candidate must be noticed to the state and the 
candidate and thereafter the candidate must file a statement of 
“disavowal” of the ad or the independent expenditure will be deemed an 
expenditure by the candidate.165 More importantly, for the purpose of this 
comment, the IRLC also challenged the state’s definition of express 
advocacy.166 
The court does not point it out, but the state’s definition of express 
advocacy is identical to the FEC’s definition developed after Furgatch 
and denounced by the First Circuit in MRLC. The IRLC argued that the 
definition was unconstitutionally overbroad and encompassed too much 
protected (issue advocacy) speech.167 The Eighth Circuit, after discussing 
and quoting Buckley and citing CAN II, found that the “focus of the 
challenged definition [was] on what reasonable people or reasonable 
minds would understand by the communication” and Iowa’s definition of 
express advocacy did “not require express words of advocacy.”168 The 
court reasoned that definitions that depend upon the meaning others may 
attribute to speech, results in lack of security for free expression. 
Ultimately, the court concluded that Iowa’s express advocacy definition 
created too much uncertainty and potentially chilled discussion of public 
issues and thus granted a preliminary injunction.169 
                                                                                                             
 161 Id. at 1064 (citation omitted). 
 162 Id. at 1061. 
 163 Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 164 Id. at 966. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 968. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 969. 
 169 Id. at 969-70. 
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Just as the First and Fourth Circuits did with the federal rule, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment was too great a 
protector of speech to allow the state rule to squash such a cherished 
right. Also similar to the previous decisions discussed, IRLC would be 
decided the same today because McConnell would not prevent Buckley’s 
express advocacy test from being applied to the vague Iowa rule. 
E. Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed Vermont’s 
definition of express advocacy in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. 
v. Sorrell (“VRLC”).170 Remarkably, Vermont’s expenditure disclosure 
requirements applied “to communications that ‘expressly or implicitly 
advocate[] the success or defeat of a candidate.’”171 All the parties in 
VRLC agreed that the disclosure provisions must comport with Buckley’s 
express advocacy standard, but the disagreement came on what 
constituted express advocacy.172 The Second Circuit quickly found that a 
plain reading of the statutes revealed that the definition covered too 
much protected speech.173 The question for the court then became 
whether it could apply a narrowing construction in order to save the 
provisions from facial invalidity.174 
The district court tried to construe the provisions narrowly and thus 
read the Vermont statute’s language on ‘implicitly’ “to apply only to 
communications that without doubt or reservation” advocate success or 
defeat.175 The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
construction and found that ‘implicitly,’ when paired with ‘express’ 
could only mean ‘tacit’ or ‘not explicit’ and thus such a construction as 
the district court formulated could not be upheld.176 The analysis today 
would not change. McConnell would not allow “or implicitly” to be part 
of the determination of what speech is regulable and Buckley definitely 
would not allow it. 
                                                                                                             
 170 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 171 Id. at 386 (quoting §§ 2881 and 2882 of Vermont’s equivalent of FECA). This is 
remarkable because the Vermont legislature, by adding “or implicitly” into the statute, 
took the Buckley express advocacy limitation imposed by the Supreme Court and 
broadened it back to the sweeping version in FECA that the Supreme Court said was too 
broad to be constitutional. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 388. 
 176 Id. 
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F. Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action 
Committee v. Davidson 
In Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action 
Committee v. Davidson (“CRG”), the Tenth Circuit reviewed Colorado’s 
independent expenditure provision for constitutionality and found that 
while it was facially unconstitutional, it was severable and only then 
subject to a narrowing construction.177 The challenged language in CRG 
was actually the definition of ‘political message,’ which was 
incorporated into the definition of ‘independent expenditure.’178 
Specifically, a political message was a message “which advocate[d] the 
election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refer[red] to 
such candidate.”179 The Tenth Circuit rejected Colorado’s argument that 
the ‘or’ meant ‘and’ and thus the ‘unambiguously’ language was not a 
broadening, but a mere clarification.180 According to the court, the proper 
interpretation of Colorado’s statute would read that a political message 
would be found if either it advocated the election or defeat of a candidate 
or it unambiguously referred to such candidate.181 The court ultimately 
severed the clause after ‘or’ and added the word ‘expressly’ before 
‘advocates’ as its narrowing construction.182 Thereafter, a political 
message was a message which expressly advocated the election or defeat 
of any candidate. The court saved the statute by this narrowing 
construction, which took the ambiguity out of the “unambiguous” clause. 
The severed clause would no doubt be severed all the same today. 
Nothing in McConnell changes Buckley’s application to such a vague and 
broadening clause. Again, the First Amendment would still establish a 
barrier in the middle of Colorado’s provision at the same place the CRG 
court recognized it. 
G. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore 
The most recent addition to the pre-McConnell split came in the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chamber of Commerce of the 
U.S. v. Moore (“COC”).183 The Chamber sought a declaratory judgment 
that its own advertisements were not subject to Mississippi’s campaign 
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expenditure disclosure law.184 The ads at issue were run during the 2000 
election for Mississippi’s Supreme Court and none of the ads explicitly 
called for voters to vote for any of the identified candidates.185 The 
district court, in language reminiscent of Furgatch, found that the 
Chamber’s ads were subject to disclosure because “reasonable minds 
could not differ that the advertisements advocate[d] the election of the 
specified candidates.”186 Addressing the circuit conflict head on, the Fifth 
Circuit identified the district court’s ruling as the Furgatch contextual 
test.187 
After actually identifying the circuit split in a footnote,188 the Fifth 
Circuit boiled the Ninth Circuit’s Furgatch approach down to its core.189 
The court found that the Ninth Circuit did not stray far from the more 
popular express advocacy standard, but that it did introduce two new 
elements: context and the reasonable person standard with respect to 
meaning.190 Citing the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the court declared that 
the Furgatch approach had essentially been rejected by other courts of 
appeals in favor of the bright-line rule requiring explicit words.191 In no 
uncertain terms, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
because it was “too vague and reache[d] too broad an array of speech to 
be consistent with the First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley and 
MCFL.”192 
The Fifth Circuit fully recognized that its narrow interpretation, in 
contrast to Furgatch, undoubtedly would allow circumvention of 
electoral regulations by the simple omission of certain explicit words.193 
However, the court found solace in the Supreme Court’s “overriding 
concern” in Buckley “that a statute with an ambiguous scope would chill 
political discourse”194 and thus the narrower interpretation was the more 
prudent one in view of First Amendment interests. 
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Applying the facts to the rule it just articulated, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected amici arguments that the Chamber’s ads were “only ‘marginally 
less direct’ than ‘Smith for Congress’” as listed in footnote 52 of 
Buckley.195 The court found such an argument unpersuasive because the 
Chamber’s ads merely connected a name to a positive character trait, 
while ‘Smith for Congress’ clearly connected a name to an elected 
office.196 In an interesting articulation, the Fifth Circuit declared that 
“favorable statements about a candidate do not constitute express 
advocacy, even if the statements amount to an endorsement of the 
candidate.”197 The court acknowledged that its holding was 
“counterintuitive to a commonsense understanding of the message 
conveyed” by the ads, but declared that such a result was “compelled by 
the First Amendment.”198 
The circuit decisions, whether or not they addressed Furgatch 
directly, all found the halls of First Amendment values to be too 
hallowed to allow ambiguous rules and statutes to run roughshod over 
political speech rights. More importantly, all of the decisions are still 
good law today. McConnell did nothing to overrule them, nor did it 
decide the split in favor of Furgatch, as Justice Thomas suggested. 
Instead, the split still exists with the weight of authority against 
Furgatch. In fact, that authority has grown in light of McConnell and 
could grow even more in the immediate future, as discussed in the next 
part of this comment. 
PART IV: POST-MCCONNELL 
A. Anderson v. Spear 
In determining whether Justice Thomas was correct in his assertion 
that the pre-McConnell split described above has really been decided in 
favor of the Ninth Circuit in Furgatch, it is important to look at the only 
court of appeals decision to interpret the effect McConnell has had on 
Buckley’s express advocacy distinction of issue advocacy and whether it 
has continued viability. That decision comes from the Sixth Circuit in 
Anderson v. Spear.199 
In Anderson, the Sixth Circuit was presented with a challenge to 
several election and campaign finance statutes by a gubernatorial write-
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in candidate (Anderson) in Kentucky.200 One of the statutes banned 
‘electioneering’ within 500 feet of a polling place.201 Electioneering was 
defined as “‘the displaying of signs, the distribution of campaign 
literature, cards, or handbills, the soliciting of signatures to any petition, 
or the solicitation of votes for or against any candidate or question on the 
ballot in any manner, but shall not include exit polling.’”202 The State 
Board of Elections informed Anderson that his plan to distribute 
instructions to voters on how to cast a write-in vote would be deemed to 
fall within the state’s definition of ‘electioneering.’203 Thus, Anderson 
challenged the statute as being overbroad, claiming that such a barrier 
around polls should apply only to express advocacy and not issue 
advocacy.204 
The Sixth Circuit introduced McConnell as a revisit by the Supreme 
Court to the “express advocacy/issue advocacy line first drawn in 
Buckley.”205 In addressing how McConnell affects Buckley, the Sixth 
Circuit quoted McConnell as holding that “[i]n narrowly reading the 
FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and 
overbreadth, [the Supreme Court] nowhere suggested that a statute that 
was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same 
express advocacy line.”206 The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the 
McConnell Court found that the express advocacy distinction was 
unnecessary in that case for purposes of analysis.207 Taking the 
McConnell language head on, the Anderson court found that the Supreme 
Court “left intact the ability of courts to make distinctions between 
express advocacy and issue advocacy, where such distinctions are 
necessary to cure vagueness and overbreadth.”208 The Sixth Circuit did 
not equivocate when it determined that “McConnell in no way alters the 
basic principle that the government may not regulate a broader class of 
speech than is necessary to achieve its significant interest.”209 
Turning to the facts of its own case, the Anderson court 
distinguished Kentucky’s statute from BCRA in McConnell by declaring 
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the state statute vague, sweeping in a variety of media.210 The court 
acknowledged that the plain language of the statute could have been 
construed as pertaining to only express advocacy, but the State Board of 
Elections chose to classify Anderson’s intended activity as falling within 
the statute’s purview, and the court deemed such a definition of 
electioneering as overbroad.211 Continuing to distinguish its own facts 
from McConnell, the court found that “unlike McConnell, the record here 
is devoid of evidence that . . . an express advocacy line would be 
‘functionally meaningless’ as applied to electioneering proximate to 
voting places.”212 After finding the statute overbroad, the Sixth Circuit 
exercised its power to prevent the entire statute from being deemed 
unconstitutional and applied a narrowing construction such that 
electioneering may “apply only to speech which expressly advocates the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or ballot measure.”213 
While the Supreme Court denied Kentucky’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari, 214 the story of Anderson does not stop at the Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling. The importance of Anderson can be seen in the amici arguments 
made on petition to the Supreme Court. Of particular note is the amicus 
brief by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School 
of Law and others (collectively “Brennan”).215 
Brennan took umbrage with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Anderson as ‘hobbling’ the state’s regulatory ability by “reinstating the 
express advocacy test” when it should have been clear that after 
McConnell, “no one could mistake express advocacy for a substantive 
constitutional boundary.”216 Remarkably, Brennan argued that the 
imposition of an express advocacy limitation in order to save the statute 
from complete unconstitutionality thereby let the “express advocacy 
genie back out of the bottle” and rendered that statute, and potentially 
others, “functionally meaningless.”217 Fearing the import of a decision 
such as Anderson, Brennan implored the Supreme Court to grant 
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certiorari in order to “clarify the continued vitality (if any) of the express 
advocacy concept.”218 Brennan even went so far as to invoke federalism 
concerns by arguing that the Sixth Circuit “construed an important 
Kentucky law out of existence” without even asking “the 
Commonwealth for its views on how McConnell might affect this 
question.”219 
The Respondents to the petition for certiorari simply quoted heavily 
from the Anderson opinion, their best piece of evidence.220 With respect 
to the Petitioners’ claim that McConnell abolished any distinction 
between express and issue advocacy, Respondents countered by 
clarifying that McConnell merely found that the distinction had become 
functionally meaningless when a statute was not vague221 and, ostensibly, 
not overbroad. As a restatement, Respondents asserted that the 
“express/issue advocacy distinction remains valid in the context of a 
vague statute.”222 But, arguably, the most important statement on 
Anderson came from Brennan’s amicus brief when it made a final plea to 
the Court because “[t]he Anderson opinion, if allowed to stand, will be a 
model . . . for using express advocacy as a default construction in 
election-law cases.”223 
What Brennan, and others of its ilk, fails to understand (or 
acknowledge) is that Anderson is not novel or groundbreaking. Instead, it 
is merely one in a long line of precedents going back to at least Buckley 
to give proper protection to political speech. Anderson did not violate 
McConnell. Instead, Anderson placed McConnell in its proper light, 
acknowledged its relevance to the debate in a general sense, and then 
appropriately concluded that Buckley is still the proper barometer of a 
vague statute’s constitutionality. 
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B. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake: An Opportunity to Apply 
the “McConnell Corollary” 
The Sixth Circuit’s Anderson decision is of considerable 
consequence because it is the first court of appeals decision to essentially 
refute Justice Thomas’s footnote eleven assertion about the reach of 
McConnell on express advocacy jurisprudence. As Brennan’s fear 
suggests, Anderson will likely become a model for other courts.224 And 
because the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Anderson, there is 
increased emphasis to be placed upon a case, North Carolina Right to 
Life, Inc. v. Leake (“NCRL I”), working its way back up to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court.225 
NCRL I has a long procedural history, including a grant of writ of 
certiorari only to be vacated and remanded to the Fourth Circuit “for 
further consideration in light of McConnell.”226 The Fourth Circuit then 
sent it back down to the district court, where it currently resides, with the 
same instruction as the Supreme Court had given. 
Undoubtedly, NCRL I will find its way back to the court of appeals. 
Because the Supreme Court already took notice of the case and denied 
certiorari regarding Anderson, there is reason to believe that it will be 
taken up by the Supreme Court again, with a proper evaluation of the 
Fourth Circuit’s yet-to-be-determined holding. If the Fourth Circuit’s 
reconsideration of NCRL I tracks Anderson, it will serve as further 
buoyancy for those disheartened at BCRA and McConnell in general and 
will help create the basis for a majority of courts of appeals to 
marginalize the sweep of McConnell by constraining it to merely the 
third in a line of precedents going back through MCFL to Buckley. 
McConnell will thus cease to be the panacea for all the election law ills 
of so-called “reformers.” Alternatively, if the Fourth Circuit reads the 
Supreme Court’s remand of NCRL I to be an implicit directive to change 
its holding, then the court of appeals could render a decision directly 
contradicting the Sixth Circuit in Anderson, thus creating a new post-
McConnell split. And this is where the potential new split and the 
defined pre-McConnell split intersect. 
                                                                                                             
 224 But it should only be a model for placing McConnell and Buckley in the 
appropriate context. Express advocacy is still the standard against which all vague 
statutes should be measured. 
 225 N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 344 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2003). As will be 
explained in greater detail later, this case will likely be heard again and thus I am 
designating this version of it “NCRL I” to distinguish it from what inevitably will follow 
and likely be called “NCRL II.” 
 226 Leake v. N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 541 U.S. 1007 (2004). 
2005] MCCONNELL COROLLARY 231 
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., along with its PAC and Fund for 
Independent Political Expenditures (FIPE), challenged the 
constitutionality of various North Carolina election law provisions.227 
The first challenged provision, and the most important for purposes of 
this article, created a method to determine whether a communication 
supported or opposed a specific candidate.228 Specifically, the provision 
was challenged only on the second prong, which provided that 
“contextual factors” such as the language, timing, distribution and cost of 
the communication could be analyzed to make a reasonable person 
determination about whether the communication supported or opposed a 
specific candidate. This language was lifted straight out of Furgatch and 
the FEC’s rule, the same rule which was litigated in Maine Right to Life 
Committee, Christian Action Network and, via state statute, in Iowa Right 
to Life.229 The second prong utilized the ‘contextual’ method of 
determining whether a communication could “only be interpreted by a 
reasonable person” as express advocacy.230 The Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged that the first prong of North Carolina’s express advocacy 
test mirrored the one adopted in Buckley.231 Quoting from the district 
court opinion, the court of appeals found that the contextual prong of the 
statute violated the Buckley express advocacy standard.232 
The State of North Carolina argued that the Fourth Circuit approved 
the use of a contextual approach to the determination of express 
advocacy in communications by its opinion in FEC v. Christian Action 
Network. The court of appeals addressed this contention head on and 
declared that the CAN II court “was not tasked with determining the 
constitutionality of a particular regulation,” but instead was determining 
whether the FEC’s litigation position lacked substantial justification so 
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as to award fees to the Christian Action Network.233 In no uncertain 
terms, the NCRL I court declared that CAN II’s reference to Furgatch’s 
contextual approach was neither an endorsement of Furgatch nor a 
pronouncement of the Fourth Circuit’s express advocacy test.234 Instead, 
the NCRL I court announced that it viewed Furgatch as the broadest 
judicial description of the Buckley express advocacy test.235 The court 
used more explicit language later when it held that “the Ninth Circuit’s 
formulation of the express advocacy standard is broader than the bright-
line rule adopted” in the Fourth Circuit and the court thereby rejected it 
as “insufficiently protective of the First Amendment.”236 
The court recognized that “certain entities may be able to skirt just 
outside of the law’s coverage,” but that the Supreme Court drew a bright 
line and it should be adhered to in order to avoid, at all costs, restriction 
of issue discussion.237 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that not only did the 
contextual factors bear no relation to the words themselves, but that the 
context prong called for a reasonable person standard, which would 
invariably shift “the focus of the express advocacy determination away 
from the words themselves to the overall impression of the hypothetical 
reasonable listener or viewer.”238 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit upheld 
the district court’s ruling that the context prong was unconstitutional and 
it also declined to apply the limiting construction suggested by the State 
because it found that the suggested construction was no different than the 
provision’s language.239 
In its petition for writ of certiorari, North Carolina argued that the 
Fourth Circuit’s opinion should be vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration because McConnell upheld similar contextual factors in 
BCRA’s ‘electioneering communication’ definition.240 Remarkably, the 
State also argued to the Supreme Court that the Fourth Circuit had 
already approved the use of a contextual approach in CAN II, despite the 
Fourth Circuit’s express repudiation of this same argument by the State 
at the court of appeals.241 
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The North Carolina Right to Life Committee (“NCRL”), in its 
opposition brief, rebutted the State’s arguments regarding McConnell’s 
change to the interpretation of such statutes.242 McConnell, NCRL 
argued, upheld the electioneering communication definition because it 
was “defined by an elaborate but clear series of standards” and served 
only “as a constitutionally acceptable alternative to Buckley’s express 
advocacy test” without altering Buckley’s approach to vagueness.243 
NCRL’s clearest articulation declared that Buckley and McConnell 
provide state’s with two choices: 1) express advocacy; or 2) the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy through the use of “clearly 
defined requirements for timing, media, and audience.”244 NCRL quoted 
McConnell as upholding BCRA’s definition because the definition’s 
components were “both easily understood and objectively determinable” 
such that “the constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in 
Buckley to limit FECA’s reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite 
here.”245 
The North Carolina statute imposes a reasonable person standard 
that allows for the assessment of “contextual factors” such as the 
language, timing, distribution and cost of the communication. BCRA’s 
electioneering communication definition allows for the assessment of 
such factors as well, but they are much more clearly delineated. Where 
BCRA regulates broadcast, cable or satellite (essentially television and 
radio) communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate, the 
North Carolina statute regulates “language.” Where BCRA regulates 
communications within 30 or 60 days of an election, North Carolina 
regulates “timing.” Where BCRA regulates broadcasts to more than 
50,000 people, North Carolina regulates “distribution.” 
Recall that the provision at issue in Buckley regulated 
“expenditure[s] . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate.” The 
Supreme Court rejected the ambiguity of “relative to” and thus imposed 
the express advocacy standard. The McConnell majority very pointedly 
declared that the ambiguity of the provision in Buckley that forced the 
Court to create the express advocacy standard was non-existent in BCRA 
and thus the Buckley analysis was inapposite. The corollary to that 
statement is that if the ambiguity does exist, then Buckley would clearly 
still apply. It is difficult to understand how the regulation of 
“expenditures relative to” and the regulation of communications whose 
                                                                                                             
 242 Br. in Opp. to Pet. for Writ of Cert., 2004 WL 578405, Leake v. N.C. Right to 
Life, Inc., 541 U.S. 1007 (2004) (No. 03-910). 
 243 Id. at *5. 
 244 Id. at *6-7. 
 245 Id. at *7. 
234 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:201 
language, timing, distribution and cost are factors for consideration are 
substantively different. It seems obvious that the First Amendment 
concerns that drove the Buckley Court to recoil from the ambiguity of 
“relative to” would cause the same aversion to North Carolina’s 
ambiguous contextual factors, no more clearly defined. The North 
Carolina statute indeed is laden with ambiguity and thus should be struck 
down under a Buckley analysis. Alternatively, the court can simply strike 
the contextual factor language and otherwise save the statute. Either way, 
the message must be sent that First Amendment concerns are too 
precious to be so easily trampled upon through the invocation of such a 
wide-sweeping statute as North Carolina’s. 
The language of the North Carolina statute is taken directly from 
the FEC’s rule, which was taken directly from Furgatch. This contextual 
approach has been denounced by all the other circuits to have addressed 
it both through the federal rule and when implemented in state statutes. It 
should likewise be denounced (for the second time) by the Fourth Circuit 
upon remand. The analysis under McConnell does not change the 
outcome in this situation. The North Carolina statute has none of the 
particularities of ‘electioneering communication’ in McConnell. 
Taking into account McConnell, a legislature can now broaden that 
restriction of speech so long as it does so in an explicit manner that is 
clearly the functional equivalent of express advocacy. That is, if North 
Carolina wants greater restrictions on speech, then it can obtain greater 
restrictions by identifying in a statute quite clearly what is and what is 
not restricted. The State’s (or any state’s) best guide is the electioneering 
communication definition of BCRA, which is considerably clearer and 
less ambiguous than North Carolina’s statute in what it does and does not 
cover. If a statute fails to adhere to such clarity and unambiguousness, 
then courts should be immediately suspicious of the government’s 
attempt to restrict our most cherished right: the freedom of speech. 
The Fourth Circuit has several persuasive authorities upon which it 
can rely for a decision striking down the North Carolina statute. First, it 
can look generally to the disapproval, by at least five other circuits, of 
Furgatch’s contextual language. The Fourth Circuit did just that in 
NCRL I. Second, the Fourth Circuit can look to the First and Eighth 
circuits specifically for examples of essentially the same language as the 
North Carolina provision at issue. In the First Circuit case an FEC ruling 
was struck down as unconstitutional and in the Eighth Circuit a state law 
was struck down for the same reasons. In direct refutation of footnote 
eleven of Justice Thomas’s McConnell dissent, I submit that the First and 
Eighth Circuit decisions could easily turn out the same way today, post 
McConnell. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is fervently urged that the Fourth Circuit take up the 
torch in defense of our ability to speak freely by finding that the Buckley 
express advocacy standard still has much life left post McConnell and 
that, as a result, the North Carolina statute’s blinding vagueness renders 
it unconstitutional. Such a rendering will paint a clearer picture for those 
passionate citizens actively engaged in the debate of prime issues of 
importance in our time. We cannot bemoan the average citizen’s apathy 
to public issues if we continue to use vague (and thus overbroad) laws to 
squeeze his neck in hopes of allowing the escape of only what is deemed 
appropriate for political discourse. Such a decision by the Fourth Circuit 
would be in perfect accord with several other sister circuits, but it would 
be especially buttressed by the Sixth Circuit in Anderson. 
In addition, a decision to strike down the North Carolina provision 
would add to the growing voice that Furgatch is still the wrong approach 
by being insufficiently protective of First Amendment values. It would 
also prove to be a direct refutation of Justice Thomas’s assertion that the 
split was decided in favor of Furgatch. A loyal defender of the 
constitution, Justice Thomas would likely take great delight to know that 
his assertion in this regard was ill-founded on beliefs of what sweeping 
repercussions would result from the Court’s disheartening decision in 
McConnell. 
As a result, should NCRL II come before the Supreme Court, 
Justice Thomas and his brethren will have an opportunity to set the 
record straight regarding the continued viability246 of Buckley and, 
hopefully, the Court will also take the opportunity to once-and-for-all 
side with the majority of circuits in finding the Furgatch contextual 
approach an improper broadening of the Buckley standard. If a state 
wants to restrict more speech, it must do so through a BCRA 
electioneering communication-type definition that has some modicum of 
specificity. The Court would also be able to use the opportunity to speak 
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on the proper interpretation of McConnell in light of Anderson, and now 
NCRL I and II, an opportunity upon which I expressly advocate the Court 
capitalize. 
 
 
